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COMMENTS
TRANSFORMING THE PRIVATELY OWNED SHOPPING
CENTER INTO A PUBLIC FORUM: PRUNEYARD SHOPPING
CENTER v. ROBINS
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent Supreme Court decision has affirmed a state's choice to pro-
vide its citizens access to privately owned shopping centers for the pur-
pose of exercising free speech and petition rights. The United States Su-
preme Court in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins1 held that state
consitutional provisions permitting individuals to exercise free speech and
petition rights on private shopping center property do not violate the
shopping center owner's property rights under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments or his free speech rights under the first and fourteenth
amendments. 2 There exists a delicate balance between the competing in-
terests of the shopping center owner and the interests of those who seek
to exercise free speech on his property. Thus, when an attempt is made to
exercise free speech on private property that is held open to the general
public, and the owner seeks to prohibit that free expression, a clash of
fundamental constitutional rights can result.
This comment first will examine the major United States Supreme
Court decisions addressing the exercise of first amendment rights on pri-
vate shopping center property. The discussion will show how the Burger
Court has chosen to resolve the conflict in favor of the shopping center
owner unless state law has authorized public access to shopping centers
1. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
2. Id. at 88. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The fifth amendment in
pertinent part provides: "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment makes both the first and
fifth amendments applicable to the states. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
(first amendment rights protected by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause); Chi-
cago, B.& Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (fifth amendment command that property
not be taken without just compensation is absorbed into the fourteenth amendments due
process guarantee).
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for free speech purposes. Focus will then turn to the California Supreme
Court's departure from the current law as articulated by our highest
Court. Finally, this comment will examine the United States Supreme
Court's affirmance of the California Supreme Court's decision requiring
shopping center owners to provide public access to their property for the
purpose of exercising free speech.
II. THE EARLIER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
While judicial interpretation of first amendment rights is a twentieth
century phenomenon, the issue of first amendment rights on private
property has not been the object of extensive litigation.3 Most of the case
law deals with government, rather than private, suppression of free
speech."
The first Supreme Court case dealing with the exercise of free speech
on private property was Marsh v. Alabama,5 decided in 1946. The case
involved a Jehovah's Witness who was arrested for violating Alabama's
trespass laws after he had distributed religious literature in the major
business district of a company owned town. Prior to Marsh, it was well
settled that municipalities could not absolutely bar free speech activity
on public streets or sidewalks." The problem in Marsh, however, was that
the private corporation had title to all the sidewalks, streets, stores, resi-
dences, and everythinng else that goes to make up a town. Thus, the
Court had to determine to what extent the corporation, as owner of the
town, could control the use of its private property and whether it could
3. Note, The Shopping Center as a Forum for the Exercise of First Amendment Rights,
37 ALB. L. REv. 556, 557 (1973).
4. Id. at 557 n.13. The author cites Van Alstyne and Karst in their article, State Action,
14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 4 (1961), noting:
Those who struggle to protect free speech.., have their hands full with government;
they have little spare time for the more sophisticated forms of private repression. As
a consequence, the battle lines have formed around the substantive definition of the
rights in question rather than the source of threats to the rights.
5. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
6. Justice Black, author of the Marsh opinion, wrote: "[N]either a State nor a municipal-
ity [could] completely bar the distribution of literature containing religious or political ideas
on its streets, sidewalks and public places. . . ." Id. at 504. See, e.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318
U.S. 413 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
The freedoms of speech and press guaranteed by the first amendment are among those
fundamental rights protected by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause against
abridgement by the state or local governments. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 570-71 (1942); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
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prohibit free speech in the town by virtue of its private ownership.
The Marsh Court, without calling it by name,7 initiated the "public
function" state action theory.8 Since the company town, albeit privately
owned, had assumed the regular governmental functions of a state-cre-
ated municipality, the private corporate owner was subject to the same
fourteenth amendment restrictions imposed on the states.9 Therefore a
privately owned town, like the public municipality, could not enforce the
state's trespass laws in order to absolutely prohibit free speech.10
Marsh v. Alabama was not a shopping center case, but the Supreme
Court enunciated two general principles which, in later decisions involv-
ing shopping centers, became the source of heated controversy. The first
principle was that when a private property owner opens his land for gen-
eral public use, his private property rights are diminished and circum-
scribed by the constitutional rights of the invited public.11 The second
principle was that in balancing the rights of property owners to regulate
the use of their property against the rights of invitees to exercise freedom
of speech, "the latter occupy a preferred position. 1 2 These principles
suggested that private property at times could be an appropriate public
forum.
7. The Marsh opinion never explicitly referred to state action. The "public function" ra-
tionale is a strand of the state action concept.
8. It was necessary to ascertain whether the deprivation of first amendment rights was
the result of state action because U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part-
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law ... ." (emphasis added). The Supreme Court will apply
strict scrutiny to any governmental regulation of public solicitation. See Hynes v. Mayor of
Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
Private wrongdoing may sometimes rise to the level of state action. Basically the "public
function" rationale holds that if private parties carry out inherently governmental functions,
these functions may be deemed public-as if the state itself had performed them. Some
activities have been held by the Court to be inherently public and, therefore, state action,
regardless of how or by whom they are performed. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966) (the public character of a privately owned park makes it subject to the fourteenth
amendment prohibition against racial segregation); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
("white primaries" conducted by private political association were state action and violated
fifteenth amendment). In Marsh, the owners of the company town were performing the full
spectrum of municipal powers and therefore stood in the shoes of the state. Thus, the com-
pany town's act of prohibiting the distribution of religious literature was state action. See
also Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972).
9. 326 U.S. at 508.
10. Id. at 509.
11. Id. at 506.
12. Id. at 509.
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The first case involving the exercise of first amendment rights in a pri-
vately owned shopping center did not come before the Court until
twenty-two years later when the Justices decided Food Employees Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc."5 The issue was whether the owner of a
private shopping center could prohibit certain persons from picketing a
supermarket located within the shopping center. The picketing was con-
ducted by union members protesting the hiring of non-union employees
by the supermarket. In a six to three decision, the Court relied in part on
Marsh, holding that a state trespass law could not be applied to enjoin
peaceful labor picketing on the shopping center premises. Justice Mar-
shall's majority opinion held that the pickets could not be enjoined on the
ground that the picketing was an invasion of private property rights be-
cause the shopping center was "clearly the functional equivalent of the
business district of Chickasaw involved in Marsh.' 4 Thus, according to
Marshall, "the shopping center serves as the community business block' 1 5
so that the state cannot delegate power, through the use of its trespass
laws, to exclude the public from exercising its first amendment rights on
shopping center premises. 8
However, after deciding that the shopping center was the "functional
equivalent" of the business district in Marsh, the Logan Valley Court
seemed to narrow its holding. First, the decision implicitly sanctioned
only free speech related to the operation of the shopping center. 7 The
union picketing was directly related to the manner in which the super-
market was operating on the shopping center premises and was therefore
permissible. Second, the Court concluded that there were no effective al-
ternate forums for the union to convey its message.'8 There were no pub-
lic streets or sidewalks close enough to the shopping center that would
allow the union to target its activity to the supermarket and its patrons.
The best forum, therefore, was the shopping center premises.
It is unclear from the opinion why the Logan Valley Court found it
necessary to emphasize the two factors mentioned above. The case really
turned upon the "functional equivalency" of the shopping center to the
business district in Marsh,'" not upon whether the speech was related to
13. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
14. Id. at 318.
15. Id. at 319.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 319-20.
18. Id. at 322-23.
19. Despite Justice Black's dissent, see note 22 infra, the majority in Logan Valley
adopted a more conceptual application of Marsh:
We see no reason why access to a business district in a company town for the pur-
702 [Vol. 15:699
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the shopping center's use or whether alternative forums were available to
the union. In Marsh, the literature distributed by the Jehovah's Witness
had nothing to do with the business district's operations nor did the
Court concern itself with whether the religious canvasser could have gone
elsewhere to communicate her views. Further, to deny a person the right
to speak in one place because he can speak freely in another seems to beg
the entire question of free speech.20 Therefore, if the Logan Valley Court
did rely on the "functional equivalency" test as being dispositive, it was
unnecessary to limit the decision to its facts.
Notwithstanding the limited scope of Logan Valley, Justice Black, the
author of the Marsh opinion, dissented vigorously. The majority, he in-
sisted, had misinterpreted Marsh: "The question is, Under what circum-
stances can private property be treated as though it were public? The
answer that Marsh gives is when that property has taken on all the at-
tributes of a town ... .,"21 According to Justice Black, a small, two-store
shopping center was a far cry from the "business district" in Marsh.
22
Therefore, he concluded that the shopping center owner's prohibition of
the union activity did not constitute state action because the shopping
center had still retained its largely private character.
pose of exercising First Amendment rights should be constitutionally required, while
access for the same purpose to property functioning as a business district should be
limited simply because the property surrounding the "business district" is not under
the same ownership.
391 U.S. at 319.
20. The Supreme Court in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) declared: "[O]ne is
not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Accord, In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845,
-n.7, 434 P.2d 353, 357 n.7, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 n.7 (1967): "It is immaterial that
another forum, equally effective may have been available to petitioners .... Absent the
presence of some conflicting interest that could be protected in no other way, petitioners
have the right to choose their own forum."
21. 391 U.S. at 332 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
22. Id. at 331. Justice Black believed the Marsh rationale should not be applied to the
Logan Valley Shopping Center because the small shopping center was not a state-created
municipality:
I think it is fair to say that the basis on which the Marsh decision rested was that the
property involved encompassed an area that for all practical purposes had been
turned into a town; the area had all the attributes of a town and was exactly like any
other town in Alabama. I can find very little resemblance between the shopping
center involved in this case and Chickasaw, Alabama. There are no homes, there is no
sewage disposal plant, there is not even a post office on this private property which
the Court now considers the equivalent of a "town." Indeed, at the time this injunc-
tion was issued, there were only two stores on the property .... All I can say is that
this sounds like a very strange "town" to me.
Id. at 331.
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The majority, however, saw no need for Justice Black's narrow reading
of Marsh. It was not necessary for the shopping center to take on all the
attributes of a municipality before it could be regarded as an appropriate
forum for individuals to exercise free speech.s Justice Marshall empha-
sized that the "naked title" of the shopping center owner, without more,
was not a sufficient property interest to justify suppression of free speech
on property that was largely public in nature.24 The owner, having made
his property open to the public, could not argue that his privacy or exclu-
sive possession and enjoyment were impaired by an additional group of
people on his premises conducting an orderly speech activity.
Nevertheless, the Logan Valley decision was a limited ruling, allowing
free speech activity on shopping center premises because the purpose of
the speech was related to the shopping center's use. Therefore, the ques-
tion of whether private shopping center owners could, consistent with the
first amendment, enjoin picketing (or any other form of speech) not di-
rectly related to the shopping center's use was not resolved by the
decision.2
Four years later, the Supreme Court, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,2 6 had
the opportunity to decide the question reserved in Logan Valley. Lloyd
involved the constitutionality of a large shopping center's ban on the dis-
tribution of handbills on its premises. The lower courts, relying on Marsh
and Logan Valley, held the ban was unconstitutional and upheld the
anti-war leafleteers' rights to circulate handbills in the mall complex. 7 In
a five to four decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the pri-
vate shopping center had been so dedicated to public use as to permit the
handbillers to assert their first amendment rights on the shopping
23. The dispute between Justice Marshall and Justice Black was whether private control
over the full spectrum of governmental duties was necessary in order to subject private
property to the same constitutional restrictions imposed on state-created municipalities.
Language in Marsh indicates that its holding might apply in situations where the private
assumption of public or governmental functions was less than complete. See Marsh v. Ala-
bama, 326 U.S. at 506.
24. Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall asserted that mere ownership of the shop-
ping center did not justify the owner's prohibition of the pickets' activity:.
[U]nlike a situation involving a person's home, no meaningful claim to protection of a
right of privacy can be advanced by respondents here. Nor on the facts of the case
can any significant claim to protection of the normal business operation of the prop-
erty be raised. Naked title is essentially all that is at issue.
391 U.S. at 324.
25. Id. at 320 n.9.
26. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
27. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Or. 1970), af'd, 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.
1971).
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center's property.2 8
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Lloyd, criticized the Logan
Valley Court for its interpretation of Marsh.29 After restating of Justice
Black's dissent in Logan Valley,30 he distinguished Lloyd from Logan
Valley on the facts. Unlike the labor picketing in Logan Valley, the anti-
war handbilling "had no relation to any purpose for which the center was
built and being used."3 1 Moreover, as the Logan Valley Court had indi-
cated, the pickets' message could not reach the patrons of the supermar-
ket unless the union was allowed to picket on the shopping center prop-
erty. The handbilling in Lloyd, however, was not directed to anyone
specifically using the shopping center; the shopping center's customers
could be easily solicited in public areas (streets and sidewalks) just
outside the shopping center's interior mall.3 2 Thus, absent a showing that
the speech activity warranted expression on the shopping center prem-
ises, the handbillers were required to utilize alternative forums to convey
their message.
With regard to the Logan Valley "functional equivalent" rationale,
Justice Powell emphasized that Marsh, which the Logan Valley Court
had relied on, had involved a company town which, although privately
owned, had assumed "all the attributes of a state-created municipality."33
Therefore, while the Marsh Court may have correctly found state action
because of the public nature of the corporate town, that rationale could
not extend to a shopping center; the shopping center was not the func-
tional equivalent of the public business district involved in Marsh." The
"functional equivalent" language in Logan Valley was unnecessary to the
decision.35 The argument stressing the functional similarity of a shopping
center to a full-fledged business district "reache[d] too far. 3 s6
28. 407 U.S. at 570. The lower courts had granted the anti-war handbillers an injunction
against the shopping center. The Supreme Court ordered the injunction vacated.
29. Id. at 562-63.
30. Id. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
31. 407 U.S. at 564.
32. Id. at 566-67.
33. Id. at 569.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 563.
36. Id. at 569. Justice Powell's opinion in Lloyd adopts a very strict "public function"
state action test. Regarding the Lloyd Court's refusal to expand the basic principles enunci-
ated in Marsh, one commentator notes:
The efforts by the majority in Lloyd to distinguish Marsh by finding technical,
physical differences were a consequence of their decision to limit the thrust of Marsh.
But Marsh was a sound decision; its strength lay in its awareness of the importance
to the public that the channels of communication remain unobstructed. The decision
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Thus, Justice Powell distinguished the Lloyd case from the Logan Val-
ley decision by citing the two factors mentioned in Logan Valley: first,
the speech activity must be related to the shopping center's use; and, sec-
ond, there must be no other available forum for the communicators to
convey their message. Both Marsh and Logan Valley were restricted to
their respective fact situations and were diluted considerably in their
precedential value in affirming the right to exercise free speech in pri-
vately owned shopping centers.
Justice Marshall dissented in Lloyd and found the characteristics of
the Lloyd Shopping Center sufficient to apply the Logan Valley "func-
tional equivalent" rationale.3 7 Justice Marshall argued that the Lloyd
Center had large parking areas, privately owned walkways leading from
store to store, commercial facilities, professional offices, and a network of
public access roads running through the center itself. The shopping
center had employed its own police force of private guairds who were
given full police power by the City of Portland. 8 Justice Marshall also
pointed to evidence in the record which indicated that the City of Port-
land intended the Lloyd Center to function as a "public business dis-
trict."3 9 Thus, in Justice Marshall's view, the Lloyd Center was in fact a
public business district and could not escape its obligations under the
first and fourteenth amendments simply because it was privately owned.
Justice Marshall further added that, like the shopping center owner-in
Logan Valley, the owner in Lloyd had not shown that a substantial prop-
erty interest was affected by the handbilling activity.0 Therefore, he felt
should not be read as setting forth guidelines for the number of post offices and sew-
age treatment plants which must be present on private property in order for it to be
found that the owner may no longer prohibit free expression there.
25 ALA. L. R-v. 76, 85-86 (1972). Another commentator, however, suggests that a restrictive
view of state action is warranted: "'Without the state function as a limiting device, the
concept of constitutional rights would potentially spill over into the whole domain of tradi-
tionally private affairs, and the courts could easily be forced into the position of drawing
lines founded on artificial distinctions.'" 44 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 130, 136 n.41 (1975) (quot-
ing Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. Rav. 1083, 1098 (1960)).
37. 407 U.S. at 570, 575 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 575-76. Justice Marshall asserted that the city ordinance requiring the vacation
of about eight acres of public streets for the Lloyd Center set forth the city's view of the
shopping center's function. The ordinance in pertinent part provided: "WHEREAS the
Council finds that the reason for these vacations is for general building purposes to be used
in the development of a general retail business district ... the Council ... finds that. . .
it is necessary to vacate the streets above mentioned .. " (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted). Id.
40. Justice Marshall could not accept Lloyd Center's argument that permitting free
speech activity on the premises would drive customers away:
[Vol. 15:699
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that the outcome of the case should not turn on the relation of the activ-
ity to the shopping center's use, but on a balancing of the conflicting free
speech and property rights of the litigants.41 According to the four dis-
senting Justices,42 the handbillers' rights of free speech outweighed the
shopping center owner's right to control the use of his property.43
The Lloyd decision's attack on Logan Valley relied on the dissents to
the latter case 44 and signaled a shortened life for Logan Valley. Subse-
quently, Logan Valley was explicitly overruled in Hudgens v. NLRB.45
Hudgens owned a mall of sixty retail stores in suburban Atlanta. One of
the sixty stores was leased by Butler Shoe Company which also owned a
warehouse in another part of town. As a result of a labor dispute, the
warehouse employees picketed all of Butler's retail stores, including the
one at Hudgens' shopping center. After threats of arrest, the union mem-
bers left and filed an unfair labor practice charge. Basing its decision on
It is undisputed that some patrons will be disturbed by any First Amendment activ-
ity that goes on, regardless of its object. But, there is no evidence to indicate that
speech directed to topics unrelated to the shopping center would be more likely to
impair the motivation of customers to buy than speech directed to the uses to which
the Center is put, which ... is constitutionally protected under Logan Valley. On
the contrary, common sense would indicate that speech that is critical of a shopping
center or one or more of its stores is more likely to deter consumers from purchasing
goods or services than speech on any other subject.
Id. at 581-82.
41. Id. at 573, 585. Justice Marshall also attacked the majority's position that the Lloyd
Center was open to the public solely for the purpose of shopping. The shopping center was
open to the public and used for conducting first amendment activity.
The District Court observed that Lloyd Center invites schools to hold football ral-
lies, presidential candidates to give speeches, and service organizations to hold Veter-
ans Day ceremonies on its premises. The court also observed that the Center permits
the Salvation Army, the Volunteers of America, and the American Legion to solicit
funds in the Mall.
I believe that the lower courts correctly held that the respondents' activities were
directly related in purpose to the use to which the shopping center was being put.
Id. at 578-79.
42. Justices Douglas, Brennan and Stewart joined Marshall in the dissent.
43. 407 U.S. at 573. Neither the Lloyd Corporation nor the American Retail Federation as
amicus curiae had urged that Logan Valley was incorrectly decided. Both parties agreed
that a balance must be struck between the property interests of shopping centers and first
amendment rights of shopping center users. Id. at 585.
44. In Lloyd, Justice Powell incorporated, in part, both Justice Black's and Justice
White's dissent to Logan Valley. Justice Powell believed that since Justice Black was the
author of the Marsh opinion, his criticism of the Logan Valley majority's interpretation of
Marsh was "especially meaningful." 407 U.S. at 562 n.10.
45. 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Justice Stewart, who had joined in Justice Marshall's dissent in
Lloyd, wrote this plurality opinion.
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Logan Valley, the NLRB ruled that Hudgens had committed an unfair
labor practice.4 The Board found that the Logan Valley decision had
protected labor picketing at shopping centers because the activity was di-
rectly related to the center's use. The Fifth Circuit affirmed 47 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether access to private
property for labor picketing was a matter of constitutional law, labor law,
a combination of both, or neither.48
In determining the first amendment issue, the Court reviewed Marsh,
Logan Valley and Lloyd and concluded that the rationale in Logan Val-
ley had not survived Lloyd.4 Justice Stewart put to rest the state action
"government function" test enunciated in Logan Valley: "If a large self-
contained shopping center is the functional equivalent of a municipality,
as Logan Valley held, then the First and Fourteenth Amendments would
not permit control of speech within such a center to depend upon the
speech's content." 50 Justice Stewart cited several cases supporting the
principle that a municipality or government could not regulate free
speech on the basis of its subject matter.5 1
In Justice Stewart's view either Logan Valley or Lloyd was decided in-
correctly. The Court chose Logan Valley because its weakness was in its
attempt to expand the Marsh state action concept. Justice Stewart con-
cluded "that under the present state of the law the constitutional guaran-
tee of free expression has no part to play in a case such as this."52
Arguably Hudgens has removed all speech activity at shopping centers
from the protection of the first amendment. With Logan Valley over-
ruled, there is no protection of free speech even where the speech is re-
lated to the shopping center's use. Under the Lloyd rationale, speech that
46. Scott Hudgens, 192 N.L.R.B. 671, 672 (1971).
47. Hudgens v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1974).
48. 424 U.S. at 512.
49. Id. at 518.
50. Id. at 520. Justice Stewart stated that if shopping centers were to be treated as mu-
nicipalities then shopping centers must necessarily be governed by the same constitutional
limitations imposed on municipal governments. Id.
51. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mos-
ley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
Logan Valley permitted labor picketing on shopping center premises but did not protect
speech unrelated to the purpose for which the shopping center was being used. Thus the
decision permitted the shopping center to prohibit or allow free speech on the basis of its
content. Lloyd, however, rejected the premise that a shopping center was the functional
equivalent of a state-created municipality. Accordingly the shopping center was not gov-
erned by the constitutional prohibition against governmental regulation of the content of
speech.
52. 424 U.S. at 521.
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is unrelated to the shopping center's use is also not protected by the first
amendment. The Court in Hudgens did not explain how or why the Lloyd
decision survived or the pertinence of the distinction between "related
speech" and "unrelated speech" after Hudgens. The final position of the
Supreme Court appears to be that the shopping center owner is free to
prohibit or permit speech on his property regardless of the speech's con-
tent unless the shoppping center fits under the Court's narrow definition
of a state-created municipality. 3
The Hudgens Court, concluding that the first amendment could not be
the basis for its decision, held that the rights of the union and the shop-
ping center owner were dependent exclusively on section 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.5 ' In its first hearing, the NLRB relied in part
on Logan Valley and held that because the union had a right to picket at
a location open and accessible to the public, the shopping center's threats
to have the pickets arrested interfered with protected labor activity.5 5
While Hudgens' petition to review and set aside the Board's cease and
desist order was before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB5 6
and Lloyd. The court of appeals therefore remanded Hudgens to the
Board for reconsideration in light of those decisions. 57 The NLRB again
53. It should be noted that the speech (picketing) in Hudgens wag for the purpose of
advertising a strike against a warehouse located on the opposite side of town. The picketing,
therefore, was not related to the tenant retail store picketed. The Court could have applied
Lloyd by holding that the first amendment does not protect speech unrelated to the shop-
ping center's use. However, the opinion made no reference to this issue. Such omission may
indicate that the "related speech" test used in Lloyd is no longer significant in determining
the rights of the parties.
54. 424 U.S. at 521. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, provides
in relevant part: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. .. ." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). The union charged that Hudgens
had violated section 8 (a)(1) of the NLRA which provides in pertinent part: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer ... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
55. Scott Hudgens, 192 N.L.R.B. at 672.
56. 407 U.S. 539 (1972). Decided on the same day as the Lloyd decision, Central Hard-
ware involved labor picketing carried on by non-employees in the parking lot of a free-
standing store (not part of a shopping center or cluster of buildings). The Court reaffirmed
that the Constitution does not restrict private action. The lot was open to the public but
this fact alone did not trigger first amendment protection. The Court dismissed the consti-
tutional claims of the union and remanded to the Board for consideration solely in light of
labor law principles. Id. at 548.
57. 501 F.2d at 164.
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ruled in favor of the union"' and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that
the pickets could not be denied access to the shopping center where their
message was directly related to the business conducted on the property
and where no effective alternative means for conveying their message was
available. 59
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Hudgens argued that NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox 0 was controlling precedent.6 1 The thrust of the Bab-
cock & Wilcox rule was that "stranger picketing" upon private property
was only protected in limited situations where the employer had to allow
access to non-employee trespassers in order to effectuate national labor
policy.6 2 Therefore, Hudgens argued that labor law principles would com-
pel a reversal of the court of appeal's decision by tipping the balance in
favor of the shopping center's private property rights as against the
union's right of access to organize.
The Supreme Court declined to rule on the labor law issue and re-
manded so that the NLRB could consider the case under the National
Labor Relations Act's statutory criteria alone.6s The significance of the
Court's decision is that it left a "loophole" through which free speech
advocates could gain access to privately owned shopping centers. The
Court, by permitting the NLRB to decide whether the union activity was
protected, recognized that "statutory or common law may in some situa-
tions extend protection or provide redress against a private corporation or
person who seeks to abridge the free expression of others."" With this
loophole in mind, the California Supreme Court's decision to provide
state mandated access to shopping centers for free speech purposes and
the United States Supreme Court's affirmance of that decision can be
examined.
III. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DECISION
The California Supreme Court in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center,"5 a four-three decision, held that the California Constitution"
58. Scott Hudgens, 205 N.L.R.B. No. 104, 84 L.R.R.M. 1008, 1009 (Aug. 21, 1973).
59. 501 F.2d at 167-69.
60. 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (a company could properly exclude non-employee labor organizers
if the union possessed other ways of reaching the employees with its message).
61. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. at 512.
62. 351 U.S. at 112.
63. 424 U.S. at 523.
64. Id. at 513.
65. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860 (1979).
66. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 provides: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his
or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may
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protects the rights of free speech and petition, reasonably exercised, in
privately-owned shopping centers.
The plaintiff-appellant, Michael Robins, and other high school students
entered the Pruneyard Shopping Center17 and attempted to solicit signa-
tures for their petition in opposition to a United Nations resolution con-
demning "Zionism." While the shopping center was open to the general
public, the management had strictly and disinterestedly enforced a policy
prohibiting any visitor or tenant from engaging in any "publicly expres-
sive activity, including the circulation of petitions, that [was] not directly
related to the [shopping center's] commercial purposes."6
Soon after the appellants began their solicitation, they were told to
leave, their conduct being a violation of the shopping center's regulations.
The students complied but subsequently brought suit to enjoin
Pruneyard from denying them access to the center for the purpose of cir-
culating their petitions. The trial court rejected their request and the
First District Court of Appeals affirmed.69
On appeal the California Supreme Court was faced with two issues.
The first issue was whether Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner recognized federally
protected property rights to such a degree that the court was barred from
ruling that the California Constitution created broader speech rights with
regard to private property than did the Federal Constitution. The second
issue was whether the California Constitution protected free speech and
petitioning at shopping centers even if Lloyd had not created federally
protected property rights.7
0
In addressing the first issue, the court accepted the position that Lloyd
was primarily a first amendment case 7 which defined and limited the ex-
ercise of free speech in shopping centers. However, the court reasoned
that Lloyd did not define the nature and scope of a shopping center own-
er's property rights.72 After a rereading of the Hudgens opinion, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court concluded that Congress, through the National La-
not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides: "[P]eople
have the right to ... petition government for redress of grievances."
67. The center is a privately owned shopping center in Campbell, California, covering
roughly 21 acres. Five acres are devoted to parking and sixteen are covered by walkways,
plazas and sidewalks. The center has more than 65 specialty shops, 10 restaurants, and a
movie theater. 23 Cal. 3d at 902, 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 902-03, 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
72. Id.
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bor Relations Act, could protect union picketing by statute."3 The court
implied that if Congress could fiat union access to shopping centers pur-
suant to a national labor policy and if the Supreme Court merely deferred
to the National Labor Relations Board as it had done in Hudgens, then
Lloyd had not immunized the shopping center from the government's
power to regulate private property for the public welfare.7 4
It was well settled that property rights must yield to certain public in-
terests served by such governmental regulations as zoning and environ-
mental laws.7 5 Since the state could regulate private property for the pub-
lic welfare, it could also require shopping center owners to provide public
forums for individuals to exercise free speech. The court stated that pro-
tecting free speech was a goal at least as important as those interests
served by zoning and environmental protection regulation.7 6 Therefore, if
the state required shopping center owners to permit individual members
of the public to exercise free speech and petition rights on the owner's
property, it would amount to nothing more than a reasonable regulation
of the owner's private property.
Once the court determined that the state had the power to regulate
private property, it next considered whether state-created access to pri-
vate shopping centers would protect or enhance free speech. The court
relied on statistics 77 to support its view that suburban shopping centers
are multiplying and assuming the functions of yesterday's central busi-
ness block.78 Therefore, because private shopping centers are supplanting
those public business districts where free speech could flourish, the court
concluded that the property rights of the shopping center owner must be
73. Id. at 905, 592 P.2d at 344, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 906, 592 P.2d at 344, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
76. Id. at 908, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
77. With respect to the growth of privately owned shopping centers the court observed:
The importance assumed by the shopping center as a place for large groups of citi-
zens to congregate is revealed by statistics: in 21 of the largest metropolitan areas of
the country shopping centers account for 50 percent of the retail trade; in some com-
munities the figure is even higher, such as St. Louis (67 percent) and Boston (70
percent).
Id. at 910 n.5, 592 P.2d at 347 n.5, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860 n.5 (quoting Note, 1973 Wis. L.
REv. 612, 618 & n.51).
78. Id. at 907, 592 P.2d at 345, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858. The impact of the data relied on by
the California Supreme Court was that central business districts were declining in economic
growth because the general public was continually turning to suburban shopping centers for
its needs. For a recent update of this growing trend, see note 120 infra. The court concluded
that, because of the importance of the shopping center as a potential public forum, prohibit-
ing speech activity at shopping centers impinged on constitutionally protected speech rights.
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"'redefined in response to a swelling demand that ownership be responsi-
ble and responsive to the needs of the social whole. . .. , ",79 The justices
were convinced that the modern shopping center was an effective public
forum because large groups of citizens congregate therein daily.80 There-
fore, it seemed apparent that state-created access to privately-owned
shopping centers would serve the purpose of enhancing and securing free
speech-a valid state interest.
The California Supreme Court then balanced the state's interest in se-
curing greater free speech rights for the public against the shopping
center owner's interest in controlling the use of his property. With respect
to the constitutional guarantees protecting the private ownership of prop-
erty, the court stated that property interests emanate from exclusive pos-
session and enjoyment of the property; when the owner invites the gen-
eral public to enter onto his property, his interests become largely
theoretical.81 On the other hand, the court determined that "[s]hopping
centers to which the public is invited can provide an essential and invalu-
able forum for those exercising [speech] rights. '8 2 With respect to the is-
sue concerning the scope of Lloyd, the court determined that Lloyd did
not prevent California from providing greater protection than that which
the first amendment seemed to provide.8s
The court then proceeded to the question whether the California Con-
stitution insured access to shopping centers for free speech and petition
purposes. The shopping center owner conceded that state courts were free
to construe state constitutions more liberally than the United States Su-
preme Court's interpretion of identical or similar provisions found in the
Federal Constitution.8' However, the owner's argument was that while
79. 23 Cal. 3d at 906-07, 592 P.2d at 345, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858 (quoting Powell, The
Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 134, 149-50
(1963)).
80. See note 86 infra.
81. 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
82. Id.
83. The Supreme Court of California, after reviewing several labor picketing cases, con-
cluded that Lloyd did "not preclude law-making in California which requires that shopping
center owners permit expressive activity on their property." Id. at 905, 592 P.2d at 344, 153
Cal. Rptr. at 857. The court noted the United States Supreme Court's decision in Eastex,
Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978), holding that the National Labor Relations Act could
provide statutory protection for labor picketing despite any asserted interference with the
shopping center owner's property rights.
84. 23 Cal. 3d at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856. Numerous cases and com-
mentators recognize that state judges are not required to conform their interpretations of
state constitutions to the Supreme Court's interpretation of similar or identical provisions
in the Federal Constitution. For a thorough discussion of the "new states' rights" theme, see
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state courts may create broader rights under their own constitutions, a
state may not expand one right if doing so would diminish another right
protected under the Federal Constitution. 5 The court largely disposed of
this argument by ruling that the Lloyd decision had not defined any fed-
erally protected property rights. Moreover, even if Lloyd had recognized
constitutionally protected property rights, California was still free to reg-
ulate the shopping center for the valid state purpose of safeguarding the
rights of free speech and petition. Therefore, the California Supreme
Court could interpret the California Constitution as requiring public ac-
cess to shopping center property for free speech purposes without contra-
vening the Federal Constitution.
The California court, however, impliedly limited the scope of its hold-
ing to large shopping centers attracting large crowds and did not apply
the public access requirement to the modest retail establishment. 6 Fur-
ther, the public's right to exercise free speech on private shopping center
property was subject to the owner's "reasonable regulations" of time,
generally Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Non-federal Ground, 61
CAL. L. REv. 273 (1973); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976).
85. 23 Cal. 3d at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856. This argument was based on
the supremacy doctrine whereby the Supreme Court has the authority to bind state execu-
tives, legislators, and judges to the Court's decisions. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)
(governor and legislature of Arkansas were bound by Supreme Court decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). The U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides: "This
Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof
... shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in evey State shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State notwithstanding." CAL. CONsT.
art. III, § 1 provides: "The State of California is an inseparable part of the United States of
America, and the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land."
The supremacy doctrine presented no obstacle to the California court because it is well
settled that the Constitution tolerated a divergence from Supreme Court decisions where
the result is greater protection of individual reights under state law than under federal law.
See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
86. Citing from an earlier case involving a "large" shopping center, the opinion stated:
It bears repeated emphasis that we do not have under consideration the property or
"privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail estab-
lishment. As a result of advertising and the lure of a congenial environment, 25,000
persons are induced to congregate daily to take advantage of the numerous amenities
offered by the [shopping center there]. A handful of additional orderly persons solic-
iting signatures and distributing handbills ... under reasonable regulations adopted
by defendant to assure that these activities do not interfere with normal business
operations... would not markedly dilute defendant's property rights.
23 Cal. 3d at 910-11, 592 P.2d at 347-48, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860 (quoting Diamond v. Bland, 3
Cal. 3d at 665, 477 P.2d at 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 501).
[Vol. 15:699
PRUNEYARD SHOPPING CENTER
place, and manner of the protected speech activity.8 7
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION
The shopping center owner appealed from the judgment of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court holding that the California Constitution protects
speech and petitioning in privately-owned shopping centers. Justice
Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court which affirmed the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's judgment.88
The appellant-shopping center owner first contended that Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner prevented California from requiring him to provide access to
persons exercising their state constitutional rights of free speech and peti-
tion if adequate alternative forums were available.89 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument and reiterated the California court's position that
Lloyd did not preclude the state from regulating a shopping center for
the valid state purpose of safeguarding appellees' rights of speech and
petition.90 Distinguishing Lloyd from the instant case, the Justices found
no comparable state constitutional or statutory provision in Lloyd that
could have been interpreted to create a right of access to shopping centers
for speech purposes.91
Because the Lloyd Court had decided that the private character of a
shopping center was not changed merely because it was open to the pub-
87. The California Court indicated that the owner could in some way regulate the pro-
tected speech activity through time, place and manner rules 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 592 P.2d at
347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860. As examples of reasonable regulation, the activity could be regu-
lated with regard to time, area, and number of persons participating, in order to avoid con-
gestion during peak hours, blocking of passageways, and personal danger. Litter could be
controlled by penalizing those who litter rather than prohibiting the distribution of hand-
bills. See, e.g., Wolin v. Port Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Hoffman, 67
Cal. 2d 845, _ , 434 P.2d 353, 357-58, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101-03 (1967). So long as the
regulations are reasonable and do not, in effect, amount to a prohibition of expression, there
is no reason why they should not be acceptable.
88. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
89. Id. at 80.
90. In refusing to apply Lloyd to the instant case, Justice Rehnquist stated: "Our reason-
ing in Lloyd, however, does not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise
its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties
more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution." Id. at 81 (citation
omitted).
91. Id. In Lloyd, the respondent-handbillers relied on their federal rights as a basis for
their claim that the shopping center must permit members of the public to exercise free
speech on its premises. California's free speech and petition clauses are set out in note 66
supra.
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lic, 92 the Pruneyard appellants asserted that, as private property owners,
they held the "right to exclude others.""" This right formed the basis of
their second contention that the California restriction on the use of their
property amounted to the state's taking of property without just compen-
sation, an action which is prohibited by the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.94
The Court acknowledged that the "right to exlude others" is "one of
the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights," but that "not every
destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to
be a 'taking' in the constitutional sense."95 The test for determining
whether a state has unlawfully infringed upon a landowner's rights under
the "taking clause" is whether the state's restriction "forc[es] some peo-
ple alone to bear the public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the pulic as a whole."" Justice Rehnquist concluded
that the shopping center owners had not shown that their right to exclude
others was so "essential to the use or economic value" of the shopping
center property that the California court's restriction amounted to a
92. The Court in Lloyd noted:
Nor does property lose its private character merely because the public is generally
invited to use it for designated purposes .... The essentially private character of a
store and its privately owned abutting property does not change by virtue of being
large or clustered with other stores in a modern shopping center.
407 U.S. at 569.
93. 447 U.S. at 82.
94. Id. The Pruneyard appellants argued that since California had judicially granted the
appellees the right to invade the appellants' private property, albeit to exercise free speech,
this action constituted a state taking of property without just compensation.
95. Id. The Court defined a "taking" in a more tangible sense than just the denial of the
shopping center's right to repulse intruders. The Justices distinguished appellants' claim in
the instant case from a claim raised in the recent "taking clause" case of Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). Id. at 83. In Kaiser, owners and investors had built an
exclusive, private marina which was open only to fee-paying members. Part of the fees were
in fact paid to maintain the privacy and security of the marina. The federal government
attempted to create a public right of access to the marina because the owners had dredged a
channel linking the pond to navigable waters. The owners objected because such govern-
ment action interfered with their "reasonable investment-backed expectations." The Court
agreed, holding that the government had gone "so far beyond ordinary regulation or im-
provement for navigation as to amount to a taking ... ." 444 U.S. at 178.
96. 447 U.S. at 83 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). Justice
Rehnquist, describing the Court's methodology in determining what constitutes a "taking,"
stated: "This examination entails inquiry into such factors as the character of the govern-
mental action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations. When a 'regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.'" 447 U.S. at
83 (citations omitted).
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"taking.,,97
The Court also found little merit to the appellants' third contention
that they had been deprived of their property without due process.98
Finding that California's interest in securing free speech and petition
rights at shopping centers was as fundamental as the owner's right to
control the use of his property, the Court applied the deferential "ra-
tional basis" test.9 By such application, the Court concluded that state-
created access to shopping centers was a reasonable means of furthering
California's "interests in promoting more expansive rights of free speech
and petition than conferred by the Federal Constitution. 1 20 0 Furthermore
it did not matter that the appellee-students had effective alternate fo-
rums available for communicating their message because California had
determined that access to appellants' property was necessary to promote
the state's goal.10 1
The shopping center-appellants' final contention was that their consti-
tutional right to free speech would be impaired if compelled by the state
of California to make their property available to others for the purposes
of speech and petition.0 2 To support their position, they cited cases
which proved that the government could not compel individuals to affirm-
atively express ideas against their will or to participate in the expression
of an ideological message to which they may have been opposed.'0 " The
97. Id. at 84.
98. Id.
99. The Court articulated the "rational basis" test as follows:
[Neither] property rights nor contract rights are absolute ..... Equally fundamen-
tal with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest
... [T]he guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the
law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation to the objective sought to be [obtained].
Id. at 84-85 (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934)). The Court concluded
that California's "asserted interest in promoting more expansive rights of free speech and
petition than conferred by the Federal Constitution" satisfied the due process requirement.
447 U.S. at 85.
100. 447 U.S. at 85.
101. Id. at 85 n.8.
102. Id. at 85. This final contention was not discussed in the California Supreme Court
decision. Nevertheless the United States Supreme Court found this claim to have been ade-
quately presented in state court and therefore a properly raised federal question. Id. at 85
n.9.
103. Id. at 87-88 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state may not constitu-
tionally enforce criminal penalties against those who cover the motto "live free or die" on
motor vehicle license plates because that motto is repugnant to their moral and religious
1981] 717
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
appellants contended that California, by requiring them to provide a fo-
rum for the speech of others, had compelled the shopping center owners
to express or affirm beliefs contrary to their first amendment right not to
speak.
The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that the freedom
of the shopping center owner to dissociate himself from a speech made on
his property was not infringed by the California decision.'" The Court
distinguished the "state compulsion" cases cited by the appellants from
the instant case. First, the decisions which appellants had relied on in-
volved situations where the government had required individuals to af-
firm or participate in the dissemination of a particular belief or ideologi-
cal message. The Pruneyard appellants, on the other hand, were not
compelled to accept or reject the views expressed by individuals on the
shopping center's property. Therefore, California was not dictating what
particular views may or may not be expressed on the shopping center
property.105 Second, the Court held that a shopping center may disclaim
endorsement of particular views expressed by members of the public on
its property.10 6 Third, because the shopping center is large and open to
the public, it is unlikely that any views expressed by handbillers or pam-
phleteers would be identified as those of the shopping center owner. 10
beliefs); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (statute requiring
newspaper to publish political candidate's reply to a critical editorial in that newspaper is
unconstitutional); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (com-
pulsory flag salute in public schools held violative of first amendment)). The Court distin-
guished the cases as ones which involved situations where the government had either im-
posed requirements demanding affirmative expression of belief or required individuals to
disseminate a particular message. Such government-imposed requirements do invade the
individual's first amendment rights, as Justice Jackson noted in Barnette:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act to their faith
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now
occur to us.
319 U.S. at 634, 642.
In contrast, by requiring a shopping center to provide a forum for members of the public
to express themselves Pruneyard does not require that the shopping center affirm those
expressions uttered on its premises. No government-prescribed position or view was being
forced on the shopping center in Pruneyard. 447 U.S. at 88.
104. 447 U.S. at 88.
105. Id.
106. "[A]ppellants can expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply
posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand. Such signs, for example,
could disclaim any sponsorship of the message and could explain that the persons are com-
municating their own messages by virtue of state law." Id.
107. Id.
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The Court declared that the appellants had failed to raise any cognizable
first amendment claim.
In concurring opinions, Justices Powell and White agreed with the
Court that the shopping center owner had not been deprived of first
amendment rights.108 Nevertheless, they believed that certain situations
could arise where the owner would be forced to do more than merely dis-
sociate himself from the views expressed on his property. Some speech
activity expressed by others could be so controversial that the owner
would feel compelled to publicly disavow it, particularily if it were unde-
sirable to have the general public assume that the shopping center was
sponsoring the speech activity conducted thereon. 0 9
Justices Powell and White further argued that even where the public
did not assume that the views expressed in the shopping center were
those of the owner, the owner might still feel compelled to publicly spec-
ify particular views he found objectionable.110 Such a situation might oc-
cur if a minority-owned shopping center were confronted with demonstra-
tions by the Ku Klux Klan or the American Nazi Party, or if a church-
owned center were asked to host demonstrations in favor of abortion. 11
In such situations where there exists a strong, emotional conflict of ideol-
ogies, the owner may have to speak out rather than remain silent. There-
fore, according to Justices Powell and White, the right of the shopping
center owner "'to maintain his own beliefs without public disclosure' ,12
is burdened, "even when listeners will not assume that the messages ex-
pressed on private property are those of the owner."1123 Justices Powell
and White might have voted to overturn the California decision on the
basis of an infringement of the shopping center owner's first amendment
rights had the owner shown that he, in fact, lost his right to refrain from
speaking. Since the owner in the Pruneyard case failed to meet this bur-
den, the two Justices concurred with the Court.1 14
108. Id. at 97 (Powell & White, JJ., concurring in part and in judgment).
109. Both Justices advocated extending the "state compulsion" cases, note 103 supra, to
situations like Pruneyard where a state has required the shopping center owner to subsidize
any and all political, religious or social action groups by providing them with a forum to air
their views, regardless of how repugnant these views may be to the owner. Id. at 98. Neither
Justice, however, explained why customers would assume that the messages expressed in a
large shopping center were those of the owner. Justice Powell conceded that the Purneyard
appellants (shopping center) failed to show that they were so burdened by California's lim-
ited right of access to their property for free speech purposes. Id. at 101.
110. Id. at 100.
111. Id. at 99.
112. Id. at 100 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 241 (1977)).
113. 447 U.S. at 100.
114. Id. at 101.
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The Pruneyard decision cannot be regarded as a blanket approval of
state efforts to transform the privately-owned shopping center into a pub-
lic forum. A different result may obtain where the shopping center owner
can demonstrate a more tangible and less theoretical invasion of his prop-
erty or first amendment rights. What the Court appears to be looking for
is a more concrete injury to the shopping center owner. It is incumbent
upon the owner to demonstrate that the speech activity on his premises
impairs his commercial investments or interferes with the operation of his
business.115 Therefore, naked title and the right to exclude others are not
sufficient by themselves to justify the owner's denial of a right of access
to individuals who seek to exercise their freedom of speech on shopping
center premises. Consequently the holding in Pruneyard applies only
where the state has created a public right to exercise free speech in shop-
ping centers. If an individual seeks to exercise free speech based on his
first amendment rights, Hudgens and Lloyd will control and bar access to
the shopping center for that purpose.116 Thus, the Prun'eyard decision is
limited solely to those jurisdictions that have chosen to interpret their
constitutions as creating a public right of access to shopping centers for
free speech purposes.
Other states may find it difficult to follow California's lead in con-
verting the private shopping center into a public forum. Part of the diffi-
culty lies in the fact that neither Pruneyard decision provides any gui-
dance in drawing the line between a "modest retail establishment" whose
owner may exclude petitioners and handbillers, and the type of retail
complex whose owner must now surrender his property rights to the
state's interest in promoting free speech. 17 Some of the factors that ap-
pear to be involved are: the size of the shopping center, the number of
stores and services provided within the shopping center, the number of
customers it attracts daily and the extent to which the shopping center
has replaced the role of the public business block. The decision in this
respect is confusingly broad.118
115. According to the United States Supreme Court, the mere fact that California had
interfered with the owner's right to exclude others and to control the uses of his property
was not sufficient to constitute either a "taking" by the state or deprivation of property
without due process. See notes 94-96 supra and accompanying text.
116. Justice White emphasized "that the Federal Constitution does not require that a
shopping center permit distributions or solicitations on its property." 447 U.S. at 95.
117. The California Supreme Court appears to have intended its decision to apply to
"large" shopping centers. See note 86 supra. However, what constitutes a "large" shopping
center is not clear from a reading of the opinion.
118. Justices Powell and White appear to have wrestled with the scope of the California
decision, concluding that the decision is not applicable to privately owned, freestanding
stores and other commercial retail establishments. 447 U.S. at 96.
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V. CONCLUSION
The strength of the Pruneyard decision is that both the California Su-
preme Court and the United States Supreme Court finally took a hard
look at the shopping center owner's asserted property rights and con-
cluded that these rights were, at best, theoretical. After the decision in
Hudgens, it is questionable whether the Lloyd decision retains any vital-
ity. Even if Lloyd has survived Hudgens, the Lloyd decision does an in-
justice to the first amendment by allowing the exercise of free speech only
in those situations where the speech is related to the shopping center's
use and where no alternative forums are available. Neither of these fac-
tors helps to define realistically the nature and scope of the competing
interests involved when an individual seeks to exercise first amendment
rights on private shopping center property.
While the California approach is not perfect, it represents a more real-
istic accommodation of the conflicting constitutional claims. First, it rec-
ognizes that privately-owned shopping centers are supplanting those
traditional public business districts where free speech once flourished.119
Because of this trend, private property ownership should be redefined to
respond to society as a whole. Second, the California approach has
breathed new life into Marsh by establishing that once a private land-
owner opens his land to the general public he can no longer claim the
same property rights available to the private homeowner or single-stand-
ing store. Finally, allowing a group of orderly individuals to exercise free
speech in a privately-owned shopping center, subject to reasonable regu-
lations by the owner, does little to impair the owner's intended use and
enjoyment of his property.
Despite its affirmance of the California decision in Pruneyard, the
United States Supreme Court will remain steadfast in its position that
the first amendment does not require the shopping center owner to per-
mit free speech activity on his proprty.2 0 Therefore, it will be necessary
119. Because suburban shopping centers have sapped retail business from the inner cities,
private shopping centers are now proliferating in the urban areas as well. Says Ernest Kahn,
one of the nation's largest retail complex developers: "One quarter of all metro-area centers
started by the mid-1980s will be inside cities. . . ." Rudnitsky, A Battle No Longer One-
Sided, FoRBEs, Sept. 17, 1979, at 129. Homart Development Co., the shopping center builder
for Sears, Roebuck and Co., plans to build 25 centers during the next five years. At least
one-third of these will be inside cities. A Spurt in Shopping Centers, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan.
15, 1979, at 92. Along with the usual centers in suburban areas, developers are pushing into
inner cities as well as rural areas once viewed as "commercial graveyards." Id. It has been
predicted that there will be 25,000 shopping centers in the United States by 1985. PUBLISH-
ERS WEEKLY, Feb. 1, 1971, at 54-55.
120. Even in Pruneyard-type situations where a state has mandated public access to
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for free speech advocates to look toward state constitutions to restore the
fundamental right of free speech to its "preferred position.'
1 21
James M. McCauley
shopping centers for free speech purposes, the shopping center owner need only demon-
strate that he has been burdened substantially by the public use of his property. For exam-
ple, Justice Powell intimated that a different result could be obtained where the shopping
center owner could establish that his first amendment rights were violated. Therefore, even
where state law authorizes the conduct of handbillers or solicitors, the shopping center own-
er could object to such a public access requirement on grounds that the state has forced him
to "lend support to the expression of a third party's views" and that such state compulsion
"may burden impermissably the freedoms of association and belief protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments." 447 U.S. at 98 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
121. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
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